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Resumen: 
Este artículo evalúa críticamente el rol de las instituciones internacionales, bajo la 
visión de los neo-gramscianos y los institucionalistas liberales. Los neo-
gramscianos argumentan que el propósito de las instituciones internacionales es 
mantener el poder hegemónico. Y para lograr este propósito, el sistema capitalista 
se ha extendido a través de las políticas de libre comercio de la OMC y condiciones 
en los préstamos del FMI y del Banco Mundial. Por su parte, los institucionalistas 
liberales sostienen que las instituciones internacionales han permitido la 
cooperación y facilitado la consecución de objetivos comunes, disminuyendo la 
influencia del poder hegemónico. 
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Abstract: 
This article critically assess the role of international institutions according to the 
neo-Gramscians ' and Liberal Institutionalists ' view. Neo-Gramscians argue that 
the real aim of these institutions is to maintain the hegemony. By doing so, the 
capitalist system has been spread in the world system through free trade policies 
driven by the WTO and through conditional loans given by the IMF and the World 
Bank. Liberal Institutionalists argue that international institutions have make 
cooperation possible and have facilitated the path to achieve common objectives 
reducing the influence that the hegemon has exerted over them. 
Key words: Neo-Gramscians, liberal Institutionalists, International Institutions, 
WTO, IMF, World Bank.
Artículo: Recibido el 31 de Agosto de 2016 y aprobado el 28 de marzo de 2017.
Juan Manuel Gil: Doctorando en Administración y Dirección de empresas 
Universidad Politécnica de Valencia (España). Master en Relaciones 
Internacionales Universtity of Bristol - Reino Unido. Coordinador del programa de 
Negocios Internacionales de la Universidad EAN. Bogotá, Colombia.
Correo electrónico: jmgilbar@universidadean.edu.co
Andrés Aguilera: Master en Comercio Internacional de Korea University, Seúl, 
Corea del Sur. Politólogo de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá. Docente 
en la Facultad de Administración, Finanzas y Ciencias Económicas de la 




Para bien o para mal
Introduction
The role of international institutions in shaping the world order has become a 
central point in the debate among neo-Gramscians and Liberal Institutionalists 
scholars. From the neo-Gramscians perspective these institutions are just another 
means to support Western hegemony, while for Liberal Institutionalists these 
institutions make cooperation possible to reach common objectives. Both 
approaches concur that the control exerted by the hegemon over the international 
institutions influence its behavior and represent the main problem of the 
institutions. In comparison, the Liberal Institutionalists solution of redesigning the 
institutions is a better alternative to solve this issue than the neo-Gramscians 
solution of beginning a revolution.
For the neo-Gramscians, the alliance of cosmopolitan bourgeoisie uses 
international institutions to spread capitalism, co-opt bourgeoisie from the 
periphery and impose the world order. Yet in stark contrast, Liberal 
Institutionalists argue that states use international institutions to make 
cooperation possible.
Even though the definition of hegemony differs between the neo-
Gramscians and   Liberal Institutionalists, they both evidence how the hegemon 
controls the international institutions performance. Neo-Gramscians explain this 
with the loans conditionality of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank. Liberal Institutionalists prove it by showing how the IMF and the World Bank 
are used in order to pursue the hegemons foreign policy objectives.
Finally, while the neo-Gramscians solution, which leads to the 
emancipation from the hegemony, has high social and economic cost, the Liberal 
Internationalist solution of redesigning the institutions is a better solution.
In order to emphasize the importance of this perspective, it is explained 
Marx´s, Gramcsi´s and Cox´s approaches to the subject matter. Then the 
document continues by explaining the Liberal Institutionalists assumptions. The 
main differences and similarities of these statements are compared. In the next 
section, it is described the neo-Gramscian and Liberal Institutionalists analysis of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the IMF and the World Bank. Closing, the two 
approaches are summarized and evaluated on their theoretical merits and 
explanatory capability of the international system. 
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International institutions: for better or worst
One of the most influential critics of capitalism is 
Karl Marx. He stated that capitalism has created 
a class relation between a few owners of the 
means of production, the bourgeoisie and 
workers proletarians. Under this relation, the 
bourgeois benefit from the surplus value created 
by workers in a disable, exploitative and 
undemocratic way (Rupert, 2010). In his view, 
the bourgeoisie was also a dominant class who 
had the means to control the government and 
build power systems. Marx (1978) assumed that 
over time, the increasing exploitation of the 
proletariat would generate a revolution in which 
the proletariat would overthrow the capitalist 
system and institute the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. He also argued that the revolution 
would first take place in the most advance 
capitalist countries (Elster, 1986). Nevertheless, 
such a revolution has not occurred in most 
advance capitalist countries. Furthermore, not 
only does capitalism remain the dominant 
system in the world, it has also spread alongside 
democratic institutions.
Antonio Gramsci, the former leader of 
the Italian communist party, explained why the 
so called revolution did not took place in the 
most advance capitalist countries but took place 
in Russia. He said that in Russia, the state was 
everything and civil society was not developed, 
while in most advance capitalist countries, the 
relationship between state and civil society was 
proper and hegemony was established (Gramsci, 
1971, p.238). 
Gramsci based his explanation on the 
concept of “hegemony”. For him, hegemony is a 
relationship between classes, where the 
dominant class bears power over the 
subordinate class. This relationship is based on 
a combination of coercion and consent, where 
the latter is more used and important (Roger, 
1991). In order to create hegemony and keep the 
capitalism system, the bourgeoisie managed to 
make the proletariat believe that the system was 
beneficial for them. Therefore, they would 
support it, encourage it and would not have the 
desire to start a revolution against it. The way 
bourgeoisies achieved this goal, was by 
spreading ideologies to “civil society” as if they 
were universal truths. This was accomplished 
through private organisms such as churches, 
schools, journals, clubs and political parties 
(Bates, 1975). 
For Gramsci, civil society is a culture in 
the broadest sense and it is concerned with the 
way people live and think (Kumar, 1993). Thus, 
through ideology and culture, capitalism is 
supported (Ehrenberg, 1999). In his reflections, 
Gramsci also introduced the concept “historic 
blocks”. A Historic block is the result of alliances 
between various classes (Gill 1986, p. 210). 
When Gramsci theorized about these 
concepts, modern international relations and 
insti tut ions were not developed yet .  
Nevertheless, Robert Cox (1983) used 
Gramsci´s concepts of “hegemony”, “civil 
society” and “historic block” in order to frame it 
in an International Relations debate.  
For Cox (1983, p.171), hegemony in the 
international level is a world order created by 
coalition of social classes from different 
countries international historic block, in which 
one mode of production dominates and spreads 
into other countries. This world order is 
composed by a social structure, a political 
structure and an economic structure. It is also 
expressed in international institutions and 
universal norms. These universal norms or 
world values are spread within the world's civil 
society in order to maintain their consent. 
In Cox's vision, the coalition of social 
classes is an alliance of cosmopolitan 
bourgeoisie. They share economic, political and 
social values and thereby define their mutual 
interest and delineate their own common 
ideology (Puchala, 2005, p. 577). 
According to Cox (1983: 172) the alliance 
of the cosmopolitan bourgeoisie has used 
international institutions as tools to support 
their hegemony, to co-opt bourgeoisie from 
periphery and to impose the world order. He also 
states that international institutions helped to 
expand capitalism, and shape the countries 
policy in order to meet the interests of the liberal 
world economy. Because international 
institutions were created by the state that 
establishes the hegemony, they represent the 
ideology of the hegemony. International 
institutions also create consent among the 
world's civil society through the spread of 
universal norms. 
For all these reasons, Cox or “neo-
Gramscians” affirm that the United States and 
other Western states have projected their 
hegemony internationally (Engel, 2006) and in 
order to change the system, a revolution within 
civil society must occur by spreading counter-
hegemony ideas. Then, a revolution against the 
state should proceed (Cox, 1999: 3-8). The result 
of the revolution would be the emancipation of 
the proletariat.
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Basically, neo-Gramscian statements 
have three assumptions. First, they consider that 
the world´s capitalist system is the problem. 
Second, that international institutions support 
the western hegemony. Third, that revolution is 
the solution of the problem (Cox, 1981). 
Despite neo-Gramscian´s perceptions 
on the objectives of international institutions, for 
1Liberal Institutionalists  its aim is to make 
cooperation possible between rational and self-
2interested states in an anarchic  world (Grieco, 
1988). Based on common self-interest, states 
cooperate to maximize absolute gains 
(Nuruzzaman, 2008). International institutions 
make cooperation possible by influencing the 
states behaviour in order to achieve positive 
common goals (Keohane, 1984). So the reason 
why countries decided to cooperate is because 
international institutions are cost-saving, 
uncertainty-reducing and provide information to 
its members (Milner, 1998).
They also believe in cumulative progress 
and consider international institutions as a tool 
to solve global problems (Sterling-Folker, 2010: 
117-118). For instance, when France, Germany, 
Italy,  Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg decided to establish the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, their 
common interest was to prevent another war 
between France, Italy and Germany (Dinan, 
2005). During the last sixty years, the ECSC has 
evolved and became an international institution 
called “The European Union” (EU). Nowadays, 
the common interest persists and it is almost 
impossible that any of the current 28 countries 
who are members of the EU would consider 
having a war among each other. 
Another important aspect of Liberal 
Institutionalists is that they do not see a problem 
with the coexistence of a state and a world 
capitalist economy. They take the existing 
international system as given (Cox, 1992). For 
them the problem is the disparity of bargaining 
power between members of the institutions and 
how the institution behaviour is influenced by 
the most powerful members or hegemony (Tabb, 
2004: 94). Indeed, Krasner (1991) argues that 
great powers bargain when the outcomes of the 
cooperation are acceptable for them. For this 
reason, the solution proposed by them is to 
redesign the international institutions (Sterling-
Folker, 2010, pp. 123-129).
In summary, Liberal Institutionalists 
analysis has three assumptions about the role of 
international institutions. First, their aim is to 
make cooperation possible and pursue common 
objectives. Second, the problem is that the 
hegemon influences the behaviour of the 
institutions. Third, the solution is to redesign the 
institutions. 
One of the most remarkable differences 
between neo -Gramscians and Liberal 
Institutionalists has to do with the aim of the 
international institutions. For the neo-
Gramscians, the objective is to maintain Western 
hegemony through spreading the Western values 
and ideology. While for Liberal Institutionalists, 
the goal is to make cooperation possible in order 
to get collective outcomes. 
Despite this difference, neo-Gramscians 
and Liberal Institutions have a similar approach 
towards the problem with the international 
institutions. For neo-Gramscians the problem is 
that international institutions helped to spread 
the capitalist system and keep the world order 
dominated by the alliance of cosmopolitan 
bourgeoisie. For Liberal Institutionalists the 
issue is the influence of powerful countries over 
the institutions behaviour. As seen, both 
approaches are concerned with the influence 
3exerted by the hegemony  over international 
institutions. 
Another difference between neo-
Gramscians and Liberal Institutionalists is the 
solution proposed by each one of them. Neo-
Gramscians see revolution as a solution while for 
Liberal  Inst i tut ional is ts ,  redesigning 
international institutions is the solution. Among 
these solutions, the best alternative is to redesign 
the international institutions. The neo-
Gramscians option is a less desired alternative 
because revolution has a high social and 
economic cost. 
The differences and similarities between 
neo-Gramscians' and Liberal Institutionalists' 
approach could be evidenced in the analysis of 
the following international institutions: the WTO, 
IMF and the World Bank.
The WTO is a negotiation forum, a set of 
rules and a dispute settlement body. Its aim is to 
ensure that trade flows are predictable and flow 
as freely as possible between the 162 countries 
that belong to it (WTO, 2016). Nonetheless, for 
neo-Gramscians, the real aim of the WTO is to 
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1Liberal institutionalism analyses the role of International institutions in International Relations.
2 Anarchy means that in the world there is not a centralized authority or a supreme power that stand above states and govern the world (Powell, 1994).
3  As mentioned before, for Neo-Gramscian hegemony is the world order created by the alliance of cosmopolitan bourgeoisie. In which capitalism 
dominates and spreads into other countries with the consent of the civil society. Unsimilar, for liberal Institutionalists hegemony refers to an international 
system dominated by a powerful state or a coalition of powerful States which maintain their dominance through military and power superiority.
expand capitalism and the neoliberal ideology, 
benefiting the alliance of cosmopolitan 
bourgeoisie (Harvey, 2007). 
However, Liberal Institutionalists believe 
that the WTO pursues their stated objective and 
explain that the reason why countries decided to 
cooperate under the WTO is that they all see 
common benefits in obtaining free trade. 
Countries believe in what Adam Smith´s (1776) 
Absolute Advantage theory and David Ricardo´s 
(1817) Comparative Advantage theory predicted. 
They conceived free trade as the solution for 
economic development and poverty reduction 
(Rodrik, 1994). For example, during 1980 and 
2000, China and India achieved significant 
reduction in poverty and increased dramatically 
their economic growth as result of their free 
trade policies long with their integration into the 
world's economy (Bhagwati & Srinivasan, 2002). 
In addition, Vietnam, Uganda and other 
developing countries reduced their poverty 
following the same free trade policy (Dollar, 
2001). Furthermore, after the collapse of 
Communism, consumers in East Germany and 
Poland were able to afford “exotic” fruits as 
bananas and oranges for the first time in their 
lives following the implementation of free trade 
policies (Irwin, 2009).
Even though, neo-Gramscians are right 
at assuring that the WTO sustains capitalism and 
expands the neoliberal ideology of free trade, 
they are wrong at arguing that the WTO only 
benefits the alliance of cosmopolitan 
bourgeoisie. As mentioned above, also millions 
of poor people in China, India and developing 
countries have benefited from free trade. 
Regarding the IMF and the World Bank, 
neo-Gramscians state that the objective of these 
international institutions is to extend, maintain 
and enforce the world order created by western 
hegemony (Puchala, 2005, p.571). The way they 
achieve this goal is through increasing the 
conditionality of the loans, where the alliance of 
cosmopolitan bourgeoisie packs their 
hegemonic ideas and the loans together. 
During the last half century, the number 
of binding conditions required by the IMF and 
the World Bank has increased. The average IMF 
conditions in loan programs between 1952 and 
1973 were four. However, from 1983 to 1995 the 
average increased to twelve (Gould, 2001). In the 
World Bank between 1983 and 1986, the average 
of conditions was thirty-four. This number rose 
to fifty-six during 1987 and 1990 (Dreher, 2002). 
Regardless, the neo-Gramscian´s 
understanding, for Liberal Institutionalists, the 
IMF and the World Bank are institutions in which 
countries cooperate in order to solve financial 
crisis and fight poverty. Besides, the conditions 
are formulated by scholars specialized in 
economic development. In fact, the World Bank 
is considered the “Guru” of economic 
development (Hibou, 2000). Nonetheless, for 
Gramsci these scholars are “organic 
intellectuals” who contribute to maintain the 
hegemony over the society (Gill, 1986, pp.211-
216). 
However, this does not mean that Liberal 
Institutionalists consider that these institutions 
always attempt common goals. Various Liberal 
Institutionalists criticize the role of the IMF in the 
world economy. They claim that the IMF is 
dominated by the United States and that it is 
being used to pursue its foreign policy objectives 
(Tabb, 2004: 108). For instance, during the cold 
war loans were refused to leftist governments 
such as Nicaragua, despite they met all the loan 
requirements. More recently, an IMF loan for 
Croatia was denied based on the assumption 
that this country is not helping the United States 
war against terrorism (Tabb, 2004: 210). In 
contrast, in 2000, the IMF gave hundreds of 
million dollars loan to Ecuador because the 
United States wanted to ensure they could 
continue using their military bases located in 
Ecuador (Calomiris, 2000). Leech (2002) argue 
that the decision making process of the IMF is 
design to give power to the developed countries. 
Furthermore, pointed out that the United States 
has “de facto veto power” because most of the 
IMF important decision needs majorities of 85%, 
and this country has almost 17% of the votes.
Regard the World Bank, when senior 
officers of this institution act in opposition to the 
United States interests, they are forced to resign 
(Keohane & Grant, 2005). Moreover, the policies 
required by the conditionality of the World Bank 
and the IMF reflect the economic and strategic 
interests of the United States (Woods, 2006). 
Additionally, they stated that although it has been 
proved that some of the policies included in the 
conditionality of the loans have produce 
disasters, the IMF keeps pushing countries to 
follow them, (Dieter, 2000) moving the IMF away 
from achieving its aim. 
As shown above, for the neo-Gramscians 
and Liberal Institutionalists, the hegemon uses 
international institutions either to extend and 
maintain the world order or to project its foreign 
policy objectives. 
A common characteristic in neo-
Gramscian analysis of the WTO, the IMF and the 
World Bank is that these institutions have helped 
to expand capitalism and by doing this, the 
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disabled, exploitative and undemocratic 
relations between bourgeoisie and proletarians 
remain. Therefore, neo-Gramscians state that 
proletarians must emancipate themselves from 
the bourgeoisie power with a revolution against 
it.  This revolution ought to happen in two stages. 
First, as Gramsci (1971, p.388) mentioned, a 
new intellectual and moral order should be 
created, then the use of ideological weapons will 
be decisive. Second, once the consent of civil 
society is over, a civil war will occur. 
The first stage Gramsci referred to as the 
creation of new intellectual and moral order 
combined with the use of ideological weapons is 
based on the formation of counter-hegemonic 
strategies. Since the hegemony is sustained in 
civil society, then civil society must be the ground 
which emancipatory counter-hegemony 
strategies will be implemented (Cox, 1999, p.3). 
A counter-hegemony strategy is the actions by 
which the proletariat challenges the dominant 
alliance of cosmopolitan bourgeoisie and seeks 
to replace it by consolidating an alternative 
hegemony (Hunt, 1990: 312). Specifically, this 
means that because the bourgeoisie keeps the 
consent of the civil society with ideas and values, 
the proper way to confront the hegemony is by 
changing the ideas and values. An example of 
counter-hegemony measures can be found in the 
protest against the IMF, the mobilizations against 
the World Bank, the “Carnival Against 
Capitalism” and all the protests against the G-8 
meeting, the European Union and WTO that took 
place between 1999 and 2001 (Bieler & Morton, 
2004). According with Hunt (1990, p. 325) 
“rights” can be part of the counter-hegemony 
strategies. As he explained, because rights are 
seen as common sense and are adopted within 
social practices, they have the capacity to show 
how things should be and therefore can provoke 
action.
One of the most effective counter-
hegemony strategy that can be seen as a 
“transnational historic bloc in formation” is the 
World Social Forum (WSF) (Carroll, 2006). The 
WSF is an opened meeting body where NGOs, 
social movements and other forms of civil society 
organizations, who are against neo-liberalism 
policies and how the world is dominated by 
capital, gather to debate ideas (WSF, 2011). 
The second stage of the revolution is a 
civil war. Once the counter-hegemony ideas have 
been spread and adopted by the civil society an 
inevitable war between the civil society and the 
bourgeoisie will occur. Because, in the neo-
Gramscian analysis, the state, the government 
and all of the private organisations including 
churches, schools and journals, are dominated 
by the bourgeoisie to maintain consent, the civil 
society needs to destroy these entities and 
overcome the power of the bourgeoisie. This 
must be followed by the installation of an 
autonomous revolutionary government (Walt, 
1998, p.33). In response, the bourgeoisie will use 
their control over the government and its 
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence to 
restrain the revolution and a civil war will begin.
Civil wars have multiples negative 
consequences to its population. These could be 
divided in two categories: in social and economic 
damages. In the social damage category, the 
worst direct social costs to the population are 
fatalities and population displacement. Not only 
military personnel and members of the armed 
revolution are killed, but also civilian, including 
child and women. For instance, Cairns (1997) 
shows that by the 1990s, almost 90 percent of 
the casualties in armed conflicts were civilian. 
Population displacement is another major 
problem. To avoid being killed, civilians leave 
their homes and try to find a safer place. 
Normally, the safer place, if any exists, is neither 
equipped nor designed to receive a large number 
of people. Thus, the displaced community will 
suffer from hunger and health problems.  
The economical damages of a civil war 
are also numerous and complex. The 
more evident cost is the destruction of 
some resources. For example, part of the 
labour force would be killed, the 
infrastructure could be damaged, and 
the government will reassign public 
resources from productive or social 
activities to fight the war (Collier, 1999). 
In fact, the shift in the use of public 
resources has double consequences: the 
loss of the benefits that were being 
provided and the loss from the damage 
that they are now inflicting (Collier, 
2003). For Chan (1985) the economic 
consequences of civil war are high 
inflation rates, war debts, high cost of 
military spending and in general the 
destructiveness of war.
As explained above, the neo-Gramcian solution 
is highly expensive in both social and economical 
aspects. Hence, the cost that civil society would 
have to bear is so high that it makes this option a 
non-viable alternative. Instead, Liberal 
Institutionalists solution of redesigning the 
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Indeed, the WTO, the IMF and the World 
Bank have redesigned their roles and have 
reduced the bargaining power asymmetry of its 
members and have become more efficient in 
getting common objectives (Kahler, 1995). For 
instance, in the WTO developing countries have 
reduced the influence of the hegemon through 
the building of coalitions and have created a 
more equal decision making process (Mayne, 
2002). The IMF has a new lending facility called 
“Flexible Credit Line” which does not include 
loan conditions (IMF, 2010). The World Bank has 
increased and diversified the number of experts 
in development. Besides economists, public 
policy experts, sector experts and social 
scientists are working on economic development 
(World Bank, 2010).
One of the most ambitious proposals to 
redesign the international institutions is the 
“Global Governance” initiative. This initiative is a 
working plan to address global issues “in ways 
which both protect against hegemonies of 
whatever kind and also promote the 
fundamental values of justice and freedom” 
(Global Governance Group, 2001, p. 3). In 
contrast to global government, global governance 
involves governments, business, NGOs and 
religious communities and its main objective is 
to increase the positive impacts of globalization 
and to reduce its potentially negative effects. 
Specifically, the work plan suggests that the 
mandates of the international institutions must 
be reviewed in order to guarantee that these 
institutions work to accomplish universally 
common goals. It also calls for a review of the 
gaps in institutional design, the barriers that 
prevent coherent behaviour and the possible 
sources of conflicting objectives (Global 
Governance Group, 2001). This initiative has 
made members of international institutions like 
the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, think and 
debate about positive changes in the institutions. 
Similarly, the World Economic Forum 
(2010) has launched a new redesigned initiative. In 
it, they propose to update and upgrade the 
international institutions accordingly with current 
global concerns such as global warming, systemic 
financial crisis, nuclear proliferation, etc. Their 
p roposa l s  a r e  d i v ided  in  s y s t emic  
recommendat ions  and  issue - spec i f i c  
recommendations. All of them seek to improve the 
effectiveness of the institutions in achieving results.
These examples show two different 
alternatives to improve the effectiveness of the 
international institutions to achieve common 
goals and to solve current global issues. As 
L ibera l  Ins t i tu t i ona l i s t s  ment ioned ,  
international institutions are not perfect but can 
be redesigned to improve their effectiveness and 
to eliminate the influence of the hegemony. 
International institutions can also play 
an important role solving the neo-Gramscian´s 
problem and break the exploitative relation 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletarians. 
For example, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) is an international institution 
which seeks to formulate and supervise 
international labour standards. Hence, this 
institution can also be used to at least reduce the 
exploitative relation, making it fairer. Moreover, 
the WTO has been used to relate labour 
standards and international trade.  Finally, 
because international institutions have the 
power to influence the state behaviour, a strong 
international institution held by workers can be 
used to achieve some of the neo-Gramscian 
objectives with a lower social and economical 
cost than war.
The importance of the international 
institutions in shaping the world order has been 
analyzed with different approaches. For neo-
Gramscians, the role of these institutions is 
viewed as effective but negative. Effective, 
because it has effectively contributed to 
expanding capitalism and negative because 
capitalism is an exploitative system. For Liberal 
Internationalists the role international 
institutions have played is positive but could be 
improved. It is positive because it makes 
cooperation possible and allows the achievement 
of common objectives but could be more efficient 
if it becomes more autonomous from the 
hegemony.
Conclusion
This article has identified, defined, and 
described the role of international institutions in 
shaping the world order according to neo-
Gramscians and Liberal Institutionalists 
scholars. By doing so, two different frameworks 
were presented. Based on Marx, Gramcsi and 
Cox, the article describes the main theoretical 
approaches of the neo-Gramscians. Viewed from 
this perspective, the real aim of international 
institutions is to maintain the hegemony and 
impose its world order. Thus, the capitalist 
system has been spread in the world system 
through free trade policies driven by the WTO 
and through conditional loans given by the IMF 
and the World Bank. 
In contrast, Liberal Institutionalists 
theorists argue that international institutions 
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have make international cooperation possible 
and have facilitated the path to achieve common 
objectives and address world problems. In their 
view, states broaden their concept of self-interest 
in order to achieve international cooperation. 
For instance, the WTO, the IMF and the World 
Bank have helped to achieve economic 
development and poverty reduction, despite the 
influence of the hegemon.
Both approaches concur in recognizing 
the influence that the hegemon has over 
international institutions.  Therefore, with the 
aim of overcoming its influence, the neo-
Gramscians propose that proletarians must 
emancipate themselves from the bourgeoisie 
power with a revolution against it. Creating a new 
intellectual and moral order and beginning an 
arm revo lu t ion .  Meanwhi l e ,  L ibera l  
Institutionalists suggest that international 
institutions should be redesigned, to become 
more efficient and less influenceable by the 
hegemony. Due to the highly social and economic 
cost of neo-Gramscian's solution, this last 
alternative is more desirable. 
Further research could pursue to analyse 
the impact of the rise of China and the creation of 
new international institutions such as the New 
4Development Bank  (NDB) or the Asia 
5Infrastructure Investment Bank . 
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